

Biens publics internationaux : théorie et applications empiriques

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1 Plan de séminaire

L'intensification des échanges économiques et l'interdépendance des économies exigent que l'on examine de plus près les enjeux dont la dimension est planétaire, de la réduction de la pollution à la lutte contre les maladies. Mais pour exploiter au mieux ces « biens publics mondiaux », il est utile de comprendre leur fonctionnement et apprendre à les mesurer.

Ce séminaire a pour objectif d'offrir une grille d'analyse complète des biens publics globaux en répondant aux questions suivantes : Comment définir un bien public international ? Quels sont les acteurs en charge de sa fourniture ? Quels sont les mécanismes de fourniture à l'œuvre ? Quels sont les problèmes de coopération internationale sous-jacents ? Comment financer les biens publics internationaux ? .Quels sont les déterminants empiriques de la fourniture de tels biens ? Comment les facteurs politiques influencent-ils la fourniture de biens publics globaux ?

Pour chacune des séances, je m'appuierai sur les références citées ci-dessous. La lecture des références précédées du symbole (*) est très fortement conseillée pour favoriser la discussion de la méthode et des résultats.

Le séminaire est composé de quatre cours et d'un séminaire de recherche.

2 Taxonomie, technologies de fourniture et enjeux économiques des biens publics (*séance 25 octobre*)

Anand P. (2004), "Financing the Provision of Global Public Goods", *World Economy* 27(2): 215-37.

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Kaul, I., I. Grunberg, et M.A. Stern (1999), *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21 st Century*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kaul I., Conceicao P., Le Goulven K., Mendoza R.U. (2003), *Providing Global Public Goods, Managing Globalization*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Cornes R. and Sandler T. (1996), *The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2nd edition).

* Sandler, T., (2001), "Transnational Public Goods: Strategies and Institutions" *European Journal of Political Economy* 17(3): 493-516.

3 Séance 2 : Modèles empiriques 1 : fourniture des biens publics globaux (séance 26 octobre)

Akin J. , Hutchinson P. and Strumpf K. (2005) "Decentralization and Government Provision of Public and Private Goods: The Public Health Sector in Uganda" *Journal of Development Studies* 41(8): 1417 – 1443.

Khanna J., Huffman Wallace E., Sandler T. (1994), "Agricultural research expenditures in the United States: A public good perspective", *Review of Economics and Statistics* 76: 267-277.

* Murdoch J.C., Sandler T., Sargent K. (1997), "A tale of two collectives: sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe", *Economica* 64(254): 281-301.

* Sandler T., Murdoch J.C. (1990), "Nash-Cournot or Lindhal behavior?: An empirical test for the NATO allies", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 105(4): 875-94.

Reisen H., Soto M. and Weithöner T. (2004), "Financing Global and Regional Public Goods Through ODA: Analysis and Evidence from the OECD Creditor Reporting System," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 232, OECD Development Centre.

4 Modèles empiriques 2 : biens publics et dimensions politiques et ethniques (séance 27 octobre)

* Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly (1999). "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114: 1243–1284.

* Besley T., Pande R., Rahman L. and V. Rao. 2003. "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local Governments." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2-3): 416-426.

* Habyarimana, James P., Humphreys, Macartan, Posner, Daniel and Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709-725.

5 Modèles empiriques 3 : biens publics, concurrence politique et institutions (séance 28 octobre)

* Brender A. and A. Drazen. 2009. "Do Leaders Affect Government Spending Priorities?" *NBER Working Paper* No. 15368. September 2009.

* Banerjee, Abhijit & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," *Journal of Development Economics* 82(2): 287-314.

Drazen A. and M. Eslava. 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and Evidence" *Journal of Development Economics* 92(1): 39-52

6 Séminaire de recherche (séance 28 octobre)

Le séminaire de recherche sera consacré à la présentation et la discussion du texte suivant :

Caldeira E., M. Foucault et G. Rota-Graziosi. 2009. "Decentralization in Africa and the nature of local governments' competition: evidence from Benin." Working Paper.

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